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Ukraine – Romania: a sustained deadlock
Tadeusz Iwański
The decision passed by the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
in February 2009, which finally determined the status of the Snake Island 
and the delimitation of the borders of Ukraine’s and Romania’s exclusive 
economic zones on the Black Sea’s continental shelf removed the major 
dispute from the agenda of relations between the two countries but it failed 
to reduce their mutual distrust. The sources of this distrust include the dif-
ficult history of Ukrainian-Romanian relations in the 20th century which is 
still adversely affecting political and economic co-operation between these 
two countries and preventing them from being free from resentments. 
Romania is the only EU member state and neighbour with which Ukraine 
has strained relations, which have been seriously deadlocked for years. 
There are a few political and economic reasons for this. Bucharest’s ac-
tions taken with regard to the Romanian and Moldovan national minorities 
in Ukraine are interpreted in Kyiv as a threat to Ukraine’s national secu-
rity, and Romania’s political and economic activity in the Black Sea basin 
is perceived as contrary to Ukrainian interests in this region. In effect, 
although Romania supports Ukraine’s efforts to build closer relations with 
the Western structures in the international arena, it cannot be ruled out 
that Romania’s support will depend on the resolution of bilateral disputes 
in a way which is favourable to Romania. 
Outline of the relations
Over the past few years, Kyiv has invariably received support from Bucharest for the main goals 
of its policy with regard to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Romania has backed Ukraine in its ef-
forts to establish closer relations with the EU, and earlier also by granting the NATO Membership 
Action Plan to Ukraine. Although Romania attaches greater significance to relations with Moldova 
as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, its government has 
still backed Ukraine’s aspirations to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union 
and refrained from criticising the present Ukrainian administration for the way it is treating the 
opposition. However, neither of the two countries gives priority to mutual relations. Romania’s 
Eastern policy is focused predominantly on relations with Moldova and supporting Moldova’s 
integration with the EU. Another priority task for Romania is to reinforce its own position in 
the Black Sea region, which is viewed with displeasure in both Kyiv and Moscow. Although 
Romania has finally supported the EU’s Eastern Partnership, a priority goal for it is developing 
co-operation as part in the framework of another EU initiative – the Black Sea Synergy. 
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Romanian and Ukrainian senior state officials have met on very rare occasions over the past 
few years. The last meeting at the presidential level took place in August 2008, when Viktor 
Yushchenko was the president of Ukraine. Visits by foreign ministers have also been quite 
rare. In some official Ukrainian documents Romania is treated as a potential source of threat 
to national security1. Similar opinions are expressed by active high-ranking Ukrainian military 
officials and some experts and politicians2. The lukewarm political relations have not been 
compensated by Ukraine’s trade exchange with Romania, reaching US$1.8 billion between 
January and October 20113, an equivalent of less than 1.5% of Ukraine’s total foreign trade. 
The decision of the Hague International Court of Justice, recognising almost 80% of the dis-
puted area on the continental shelf – which has rich hydrocarbon deposits – as Romanian 
territory has been received negatively in Ukraine. Some Ukrainian media saw it as a sign of 
further territorial claims from Romania regarding Northern Bukovina (Chernivtsi oblast) and 
Southern Bessarabia (part of the Odessa oblast)4.
Relations between the two countries have also been adversely affected by the spy scan-
dal caused by the deportation from Romania of Ukraine’s military attache and his assist-
ant in March 2009 on charges of spying. 
The scandal was revealed shortly after the 
Romanian president, Traian Basescu, had 
cancelled his visit to Ukraine, scheduled 
for February, without stating any reasons. 
As a consequence, the operation of the 
working teams of the Joint Ukrainian- 
-Romanian Presidential Commission, which 
had been established in 2007 as a plat-
form for developing solutions to disputed issues in bilateral relations, was suspended. In May 
2011, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko paid a visit to Bucharest, the first visit by a Ukrainian foreign 
minister in six years, which both parties recognised as being a breakthrough. The ministers 
declared that consultations and working meetings at an expert level would be held and a pack-
age of documents, including an agreement on small border traffic, would be signed. However, 
a return visit by Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi to Kyiv in November 2011 did not bring 
any qualitative change in bilateral relations; the key disputes are still unresolved. Nevertheless, 
it is important that contacts at the level of foreign ministers became regular in 2011. 
The fact that contact at the high political level is rare is preventing the creation of 
an institutional and financial framework for effective cultural co-operation and dialogue be-
tween representatives of civil society. Romania is also Ukraine’s only neighbour, among EU 
member states, which has no agreement on small border traffic signed. The activity of the 
diplomatic agencies of the two countries is very low, and soft power initiatives and public 
diplomacy activity – such as the creation of culture centres or the promotion of tourism – 
are missing. The effect of this is that the public in both countries rely to a great extent on 
mutual stereotypes. The governments of the two countries are doing little to change this. 
As a result, their political relations are characterised by distrust and prejudice5, and Kyiv 
sees Bucharest’s activity for the protection of the rights of the Romanian national minority 
in Ukraine as unfriendly. 
The idea of a ‘Greater Romania’ and Romanian historical policy
The border between the two countries was confirmed under two treaties signed by Romania 
and Ukraine in 1997 and 2003 and Romania is not officially questioning this. However, 
since the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Ukraine Romanian 
politicians have on numerous occasions called into question the legality of the change 
 
1 Decision of the National 
Security and Defence Council 
of Ukraine approved by 
a decree of the president 
of Ukraine of 10 December 
2010 http://zakon.rada.
gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.
cgi?nreg=n0008525-10
2 For example, Gen. Yuriy 
Dumanski (http://ak.inzt.net/
newsukraine/386-19-07-2011), 
deputy speaker of Ukraine’s 
parliament, Mykola Tomenko 
(http://www.ukrgazeta.cz/the-
news/news-ua/6468-podvijne-
gromadyanstvo-zagroza-bez-
petsi-ukrajiny) and the leader 
of the Strong Ukraine party, 
Serhiy Tyhypko (Kommentari, 
11 December 2009, no. 47)
3 On the basis of data 
from the State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine.  
www.ukrstat.gov.ua
4 Another disputable territory 
is Maikan Island, which be-
longs to Ukraine. It is situated 
on the Danube, where the 
current of the river was agreed 
to set the Ukrainian-Romanian 
border. However, as a conse-
quence of a natural change 
in the trajectory of the current 
to Ukraine’s disadvantage, 
the island is now located 
on the Romanian side of the 
border, and Bucharest is insist-
ing that Kyiv should relinquish 
its rights to this island.
 
 
 
 
5 The first news announced 
in the Ukrainian media during 
the visit by Minister Baconschi 
to Kyiv was that Romania did 
not have any territorial claims 
against Ukraine.
Neither Ukraine nor Romania 
gives priority to mutual relations. 
Romania’s Eastern policy is 
focused predominantly on relations 
with Moldova and supporting 
Moldova’s integration with the EU.
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of the Romanian-Soviet border in 1940, as a consequence of which Bessarabia, Northern 
Bukovina and Snake Island on the Black Sea, which had belonged to the Kingdom of Roma-
nia, became part of the USSR. Although Romania is a signatory to a number of international 
agreements which sanctioned the shape of the borders in Europe after World War II, ideas 
for reintegrating “all ethnic Romanian territories” are still popular in the media and politi-
cal discourse. Such unionist tones can also be heard in the statements by the Romanian 
president, Traian Basescu, who has accused Kyiv of a desire to reintegrate Transnistria and 
offered a swap of territories (Transnistria would be given back to Ukraine in exchange for 
Northern Bukovina). Such declarations made by Romanian politicians are seen in Ukraine 
as territorial claims and are adding to the negative image of Romania. In this context, 
the significant support Bucharest is offering to ethnic Romanians living abroad is perceived 
in Ukraine as an attempt at a soft realisation of the idea of the ‘Greater Romania’ (Romania 
Mare) through integration of the frontier regions in the cultural and linguistic areas. 
The dispute over national minorities
According to the censuses carried out in Ukraine in 2001 and in Romania in 2002, 61,000 
ethnic Ukrainians live in Romania, and 151,000 ethnic Romanians live in Ukraine. In both 
cases, these national minorities account for approximately 0.3% of the total population 
of each country (see Appendix). Romania and Ukraine cannot agree on the issue of the 
Moldovan national minority in Ukraine. Kyiv sees them as a distinct ethnic group, while 
Bucharest believes that Moldovans are ‘Bessarabian Romanians’, and treating the two mi-
norities as one group in its official statistical data states that over 400,000 ethnic Roma-
nians live in Ukraine. Distinction between these two national groups causes objection from 
Bucharest and accusations expressed, 
for example, by President Basescu that 
Kyiv is applying a selective policy towards 
ethnic Romanians and is ‘deromanianising’ 
this national minority. This stance resulted 
in Romania’s withdrawal in 2008 from 
work in the Ukrainian-Romanian Inter-
governmental Commission for National 
Minorities, which – with the participation 
of experts from the OSCE and the Council of Europe – was engaged in monitoring the areas 
inhabited by ethnic minorities in both countries.
In turn, Kyiv is accusing Romania of bad and asymmetrical treatment of the Ukrainian mi-
nority. According to calculations made by Ukrainian state institutions, Romanians in Ukraine 
have a better-developed system of primary, secondary and higher education in their native 
language of instruction, they can choose between a broader array of programmes on the 
regional radio and TV stations, and issue more press publications in their native language6. 
Ukrainian experts estimated that this situation is an effect of Bucharest’s ill will, without 
however mentioning the asymmetry in the numbers of the two minorities and low financial 
support the Ukrainian government offers to ethnic Ukrainians living abroad. 
The strain in bilateral relations is additionally augmented by Bucharest’s policy of restor-
ing Romanian citizenship. In this context, the amendment of the citizenship act of 15 April 
2009 has played a significant role as it lifted the requirement to relinquish citizenship of 
another country, broadened the group of those authorised to apply for citizenship and ac-
celerated and simplified the procedure of considering the applications by cancelling the 
requirement to pass tests in Romanian language and culture. The context and the timing of 
the introduction of the new regulations in the citizenship act (the wave of demonstrations 
6 92 schools at different 
levels with Romanian 
as the language of instruction 
operate in Ukraine, 
plus two Romanian language 
faculties at the universities 
in Chernivtsi and Uzhhorod. 
In turn, one Ukrainian second-
ary school and 63 schools, 
where Ukrainian is taught 
as a subject, usually extracur-
ricular, operate in Romania. 
There is no separate Ukrainian 
faculty at any university 
in Romania. For more 
reference see for example 
http://www.nbuv.gov.
ua/portal/Soc_Gum/
Nvdau/2009_15/29.pdf
Romania and Ukraine cannot agree 
on the issue of the Moldovan national 
minority in Ukraine. Kyiv sees them 
as a distinct ethnic group, while 
Bucharest believes that Moldovans 
are ‘Bessarabian Romanians’
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in Moldova following the forgery of the parliamentary elections’ results by the Communist Par-
ty) proves that residents of Moldova were its main target. Statistics also show that this was the 
group from which the largest number of applicants and ‘new’ citizens of Romania originated. 
Ukraine did not react officially to the amendment of the Romanian citizenship act, although 
it formally does not accept dual citizenship. Nevertheless, this fact has been given public-
ity in the Ukrainian media and is interpreted as a sign of Romania’s ‘imperialist tendencies’. 
They also announced that Romanian citizenship had been granted to between 50,000 
and 500,0007 citizens of Ukraine, but these numbers are significantly overestimated. 
Such fierce reactions from Kyiv to actions taken by Romania in the area of protecting the 
rights of national minorities result from the lack of a coherent strategy of relations with 
Romania in Ukraine and the negative evaluation of the situation of the Ukrainian minority 
in Romania. Furthermore, it is impossible to rule out that such reactions from Kyiv are 
caused by its fear of repeating the situation existing in Crimea, where a significant share of 
ethnic Russians hold dual citizenship. The different policies applied by Ukraine and Roma-
nia to their respective diasporas may result on the one hand in the continuing assimilation 
of the Ukrainian minority in Romania and on the other in increasing the assertiveness of the 
Romanian minority in Ukraine. In the longer term, a situation like this may lead to tension 
caused by nationality-related issues in the ethnically diversified regions and make bilateral 
relations even less flexible at the central level. 
The dispute over the use of the transport potential of the Danube Delta 
One of the key points of dispute in Ukrainian-Romanian economic relations is over Ukraine’s 
development of the Danube-Black Sea deep-water navigation route in the Ukrainian part of 
the Danube Delta on the Bystroye channel (see Map). The aim of this project is to improve 
competitiveness and to increase the volume of the goods transported through Ukrainian 
ports on the Danube, such as Izmail or Reni, and the adjacent regions. The project was to 
be completed in 2011. However, Romania raised an objection, claiming that the Ukrainian 
government violated the standards of international law regarding protection of the natural 
environment. At the same time, Bucharest is developing its own transport routes, the Sulina 
and the Saint George branches, which are competitors to the Ukrainian project. According 
to Ukrainian data, the Bystroye channel has higher capacity, ships can go in both directions 
24 hours a day, and the fees per tonne of goods are lower, while the traffic on the Sulina is 
only one-way, is allowed only at daytime and at much higher rates, which is the reason for 
the losses sustained by the Romanian side.
In the opinion of Ukrainian politicians and 
experts, Romania is making efforts to with-
hold the use of the Ukrainian route and to 
block its development in order to ensure 
itself a monopoly in goods transport in the 
Danube Delta. In 2008, Bucharest decid-
ed to take the dispute with Ukraine outside 
bilateral relations and put it on the agenda 
of the Espoo Convention Implementation 
Committee (which evaluates the impact 
on the natural environment in the cross-border context) and of the EU council of ministers 
for the environment in order to cause these bodies recommend Ukraine cease work on the 
development of the channel. Both institutions granted Romania’s request, and the Espoo 
Convention Committee additionally made further work on the channel dependent on Kyiv’s 
receiving consent for such work from Romania. The Committee is still working on this issue, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 http://bukovynaonline.com/
rumunski-pasporti-ta-rumun-
ske-pitannya-cifri-fakti-analiti-
ka-vsebichnij-oglyad/  
One of the main reasons 
for such a large spread 
in the numbers is the fact 
that access to official statistics 
is difficult, which in turn gives 
rise to speculations and makes 
journalists base their reports 
on unofficial data.
In the Black Sea region, both 
Ukraine and Romania act as eco-
nomic competitors, and use the 
ecological slogans as a tool in their 
rivalry for maximising the profits they 
derive from the use of the transport 
potential of the Danube Delta.
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8 See for example the opinion 
expressed by the Ukrain-
ian prime minister, Mykola 
Azarov http://forua.wordpress.
com/2010/07/16/ukraine-is-
not-satisfied-with-romania-and-
its-position/
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 For example the construction 
of the bridge on the Danube 
between Orlivka in Ukraine 
and Isaccea in Romania.
 
 
10 See for example an inter-
view given by the Romanian 
foreign minister for the Den 
newspaper, 15 November 
2011. http://www.day.kiev.
ua/218955 
At the same time, opinions 
can be heard in Romanian 
nationalist circles, 
such as the New Right 
(Noua Dreapta), that Bessara-
bia is an ethnically Romanian 
area and should be reinte-
grated into Romania.
11 Influential expert circles 
in Romania linked for example 
with the former foreign 
minister, Adrian Severin, 
are also considering a concept 
which envisages Moldova’s 
relinquishment of Transnistria. 
This solution would facilitate 
Moldova’s integration with 
the EU, one of the key priorities 
in Romania’s Eastern policy. 
See for example the report 
from the Ovidiu Sincai Institute 
“Transnistria. Evolutia unui con-
flict inghetat si perspective de 
solutionare” September 2005) 
and the report from 
the Romanian Centre for Euro-
pean Policies “Cum am folosit 
fereastra de oportunitate?”, 
http://www.crpe.ro/library/files/
crpe_pm_19_ro_md_sinteza_
recomandarilor.pdf 
(December 2010).
and the development of the Bystroye channel has been blocked until 2014, when its next 
session will take place. Ukraine is accusing Romania of using international institutions to 
promote its own economic interests in the region. In turn, Ukrainian experts and politicians8 
claim that it is the Romanian hydrotechnical work leading to changes in the division of the 
waters to the benefit of Romania, discharging the land excavated from the seabed of these 
channels for the access path to the Ukrainian channel and the development of Romanian 
infrastructure on land is what is having negative impact on the natural environment. 
In the Black Sea region, both Ukraine and Romania act as economic competitors, and use 
the ecological slogans as a tool in their rivalry for maximising the profits they derive from 
the use of the transport potential of the Danube Delta. At the same time, the EU’s regional 
initiatives, such as the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region and the Black Sea 
Synergy, in which both countries participate, are seen in Ukraine as a tool for strengthening 
Romania’s position in the region. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the joint projects speci-
fied in the Strategy9 will be implemented in the immediate future.
The Transnistrian issue
The settlement of the conflict in Transnistria is not a matter of dispute between Ukraine 
and Romania, and the stances adopted by each of the countries could even be similar 
in certain aspects (as for example the threats posed by the presence of Russian troops 
in Transnistria). However, potentially, the settlement of the Transnistrian issue may have 
an adverse effect on bilateral relations, especially given the rhetoric adopted by Bucharest. 
Ukraine, which could play a significant role in the process of settling the conflict in the 5+2 
format, is not playing this role at the moment. Kyiv formally supports Moldova’s territorial 
integrity, but it wants Chisinau and Tiraspol to settle mutual relations by establishing a fed-
eration. This is caused by the weakness of Ukrainian foreign policy on the one hand, and 
on the other by its policy towards Russia and the fact that some Ukrainian oligarchs who 
are closely linked to the government benefit in their business from the status quo in Tran-
snistria. Furthermore, Ukraine co-operates with the administration of this region to ensure 
the rights of the Ukrainian national minority are respected. This accounts for approximately 
30% of Transnistria’s population. Bucharest also supports the territorial integrity of Moldova 
and wants the conflict to be settled within 
the 5+2 format10. However, unlike Kyiv, 
it backs the stance adopted by Chisinau, 
i.e. granting Transnistria broad autonomy 
within Moldova11. 
From Kyiv’s point of view, the increase 
in tensions in relations between Chisinau 
and Tiraspol is posing an additional threat 
to national security. In turn, in the context 
of relations with Romania, the settlement 
of the Transnistrian conflict in a way which 
would involve a change in the existing borders could give rise to fears in Kyiv that this would 
be seen in Romania as a precedence and grounds for bringing claims regarding Southern 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. 
The settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict in a way which would involve 
a change in the existing borders 
could give rise to fears in Kyiv 
that this would be seen in Romania 
as a precedence and grounds for 
bringing claims regarding Southern 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.
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12 Data from the Ministry 
of Development 
and Trade of Ukraine: 
http://www.ukrexport.gov.
ua/ukr/tovaroobig_za_stat/
rom/5916.html 
Conclusions
Considering the key trends in Ukrainian foreign policy, namely relations with Russia and 
bringing the country closer to the EU, relations with Romania are not treated as a priority 
issue but still are quite significant in the context of Kyiv’s policy in this region. Over the past 
few years, these relations could be characterised as being tense due to significant disa-
greements over the scope and forms of protection of national minority rights and the use 
of the Danube Delta for economic purposes. The disputes are unlikely to be settled in the 
short term, which will also make a qualitative improvement in bilateral relations impossible. 
The signing of the small border traffic agreement has been made dependent on opening 
a Romanian consulate in Uzhhorod and/or a consular agency in Solotvyno, Ivano-Frankivsk 
oblast. Ukraine does not want to agree to this, fearing that the number of applications for 
Romanian citizenship would increase. The census planned for 2012 in Ukraine may be-
come a source of deterioration of mutual relations given the disputes over the recognition of 
Moldovan nationality. Similarly hostile reactions may arise out of the results of the census 
held in 2011 in Romania, since both censuses are likely to show a decrease in the popula-
tions of national minorities. In turn, a positive element of Romanian-Ukrainian co-operation 
may be the growing trade exchange dynamics, which in the first half of 2011 grew by over 
96%12 in comparison to a similar period in 2010. The activation of contacts at the level 
of foreign ministers observed in 2011 could also become a good basis for the fuller use of 
the potential of bilateral relations. Disputes over minorities and economic issues are not af-
fecting Romania’s declared support for bringing Ukraine closer to the West. Nevertheless, 
it cannot be ruled out that Romania will try to use the tarnished image of Ukraine as seen 
by the EU to make its support for Kyiv dependent on the resolution of bilateral disputes 
in a way favourable to Bucharest and to secure and enhance the rights of the Romanian na-
tional minority (for example, founding a separate university with Romanian as the language 
of instruction). It can be expected that for this purpose Romania will stick to its practice of 
bringing bilateral issues to international forums, including the EU, and thus to put pressure 
on Ukraine, which considering its aspirations to establish closer relations with the EU will 
avoid any possible frictions with individual EU member states.
The Romanian and Moldovan national minorities in Ukraine and the Ukrainian national minority in Romania 
according to the censuses conducted in 2001 in Ukraine and in 2002 in Romania 
Romanians in Ukraine Moldovans in Ukraine Ukrainians in Romania
Number 
(thousands) 151.0 258.6 61.4
Percentage 0.3 0.5 0.3
Region Chernivtsi oblast
Zakarpatia 
oblast
Odessa 
oblast
Chernivtsi 
oblast
1. Maramures 
2. Northern Bukovina 
3. Banat
Number 
(thousands) 114.6 32.1 123.0 67.0
1 – 36,000
2 – 10,000
3 – 8,000
Percentage 12.5% 2.6% 5.0% 7.3% -
A p p e N d i x
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